


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6 September 1956



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
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2009
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



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State Dept. review completed

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
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
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1. HAMMARSKJOLD TO CONVOKE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
IF SUEZ SITUATION WORSENS [REDACTED]



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5. PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT THREATENED
(page 7).



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6. BRAZILIAN DENUNCIATION OF ATOMIC PACTS WITH
UNITED STATES



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7. POLITICAL CRISIS APPROACHING IN GREECE



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THE TAIWAN STRAIT



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**1. HAMMARSKJOLD TO CONVOKE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
IF SUEZ SITUATION WORSENS**

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Secretary General Hammarskjold has informed British foreign secretary Lloyd and Ambassador Lodge that he feels legally obliged by the UN charter to bring the Suez situation before the Security

Council if the negotiations break down without a settlement and the parties themselves do not appeal to the UN.

Hammarskjold told Lodge he thought the British and French were acting in a "fantastic" manner. He said that if they used force in the mistaken belief that they could re-establish their position in the Middle East, war would probably result and the UN might be destroyed.

Comment

Most members believe that some type of UN action is necessary to a solution of the Suez situation. Opinion among them differs regarding which UN body would provide the best forum--the Security Council, where the USSR might use the veto in Egypt's favor, or the General Assembly, where the anticolonial and underdeveloped nations could raise a large majority, particularly if force were used against Egypt.

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
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5. PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT THREATENED

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


Armed violence may occur in Panama as a result of the reported decision by leaders of three opposition political factions and anti-American students to support a strike by the Communist-dominated auto transport workers' union. President-elect Ernesto de la Guardia appears justi-

fied in his fears, expressed publicly on 4 September, that the objective of the strike would be to promote disorders aimed at preventing his inauguration on 1 October.




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6. BRAZILIAN DENUNCIATION OF ATOMIC PACTS WITH UNITED STATES

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Brazil's 30 August decree suspending exports to the US of fissionable rare earths and terminating a joint uranium prospecting agreement is a tactical victory for Communist and nationalist

forces. However, the move probably should not be considered as a shift in Brazil's basically pro-US foreign policy, according to the American embassy in Rio de Janeiro.

In signing the decree, the president apparently hoped to end the bitter and embarrassing controversy over the administration's alleged "selling out of Brazil's interests" in fulfilling atomic materials contracts signed by previous administrations. By this action Kubitschek may be seeking to weaken popular opposition to any military bases agreement Brazil may make with the United States in current negotiations.

The government action will almost certainly be followed by increased agitation in the Brazilian congress for the creation of a state monopoly on atomic materials.

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7. POLITICAL CRISIS APPROACHING IN GREECE

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Greek prime minister Karamanlis' government feels itself seriously threatened as a result of recent Cyprus developments.

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Karamanlis feels that his country's allies are forcing him to seek support from the Soviet bloc and Egyptian-dominated Arab states. Karamanlis recently told the American chargé that his government will soon be forced either to revise its pro-Western foreign policy or to resign.

The Greek government's increasing isolation from its allies over the Cyprus issue is strengthening domestic advocates of neutralism. If Karamanlis should fall, Greek frustrations over Cyprus would bring to power a government susceptible to Communist influence in promoting the Cypriot cause regardless of the effect on the country's alliances.

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BIWEEKLY SUMMARY
(23 August-5 September 1956)

THE TAIWAN STRAIT

**Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group
for the Taiwan Strait Problem**

25X1A

1. There was no significant combat activity during the period.

2. Recent progress in the construction of the trans-Fukien railroad suggests that the Communists may complete the line to Amoy in November or December. Peiping has announced completion of the roadbed and the laying of tracks on 290 miles of the 422-mile line. Construction of the railway station at Amoy is under way.

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USABILITY

DESIGNATIONS		PRIMARY AIRFIELD	SECONDARY AIRFIELD	1	2	3
CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT IN AREA WITH PREPARED RUNWAY GENERALLY 3000 FEET OR LONGER		●	AUXILIARY OR EMERGENCY BASES OR FIELDS OF LESSER IMPORTANCE RUNWAYS GENERALLY LESS THAN 3000 FEET	AIG-15	TU-2	UNKNOWN
ACTIVE BASE FOR MILITARY & CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT. SOME BASES USED BY PISTON TYPES MAY BE USABLE BY JETS		●	OPERATIONAL	AIG-17	IL-10	
INACTIVE BASES CAPABLE OF USE BY AIRCRAFT		▲	OPERATIONAL	IL-6	IA-9/11	
CURRENT STATUS UNDETERMINED		▲	OPERATIONAL	IL-2	ETC.	
		●	SERVICEABLE			UNKNOWN
		▲	UNKNOWN			UNDER CONSTRUCTION

* FIELDS NOT CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING SUSTAINED OPERATIONS AT PRESENT

